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Abstract 
A core, but so far untested, proposition of the new politics perspective, originally introduced 
by Paul Pierson, is that welfare state cutbacks will be implemented using so-called ‘invisible’ 
policy instruments, e.g. a change in indexation rules. Expansion should, by implication, 
mainly happen using ‘visible’ policy instruments, e.g. a change in nominal benefits. We have 
coded 1,030 legislative reforms of old-age pensions and unemployment protection in Britain, 
Denmark, Finland, and Germany from 1974 to 2014. With this unique data at hand, we find 
substantial support for this crucial new politics proposition.  
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Introduction 
Reforming the welfare state is not easy. It can be electorally dangerous for the politicians 
willing to try because voters will oppose cuts in their entitlements. Big, visible reforms such 
as a cut in nominal benefits are, as a result, rare – and if they occur, voters will punish the 
responsible politicians by voting for another party. If reforms happen, they will therefore 
most of time be ‘invisible’, e.g. a technical change in indexation rules or the assessment base 
for calculating benefits. In a nutshell, this is the core claim of Pierson’s (1994; 1996) classic 
argument about the new politics of the welfare state.  
 The new politics perspective has spurred one of the most fruitful debates in the 
welfare state literature. Clayton and Pontusson (1998), Korpi and Palme (2003) and Allan 
and Scruggs (2004) were quick to point out that the welfare state, and especially benefits to 
the jobless, has been retrenched quite a bit; an observation that has been repeated several 
times since (e.g. Clasen, 2007; Clasen and Clegg, 2011; Jensen, 2014). The basic claim that 
retrenchment is unpopular has also been questioned: Giger (2010; 2011), Giger and Nelson 
(2013) and Schumacher et al. (2013), among others, show that there is no, or only a very 
conditional, association between cuts in replacement rates and the subsequent vote share of 
governments.  
 It would appear, in short, that the new politics argument has been firmly 
refuted. Governments can more or less do what they want without fear of an electoral 
backlash. We have no quarrels with this critique of the new politics argument; it would seem 
that there have been many cutbacks and that governments, on average, have escaped blame. 
Yet one central proposition of the new politics argument has never been put to the test: 
namely whether cutbacks are implemented using certain ‘invisible’ policy instruments. To be 
sure, both Pierson himself and later research (e.g. Lindbom, 2001; 2007; Zohlnhöfer, 2007; 
Jensen, 2011; Wenzelburger, 2011; Green-Pedersen et al., 2012) showed that politicians 
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sometimes use such blame avoidance tactics in concrete reform situations, but we have no 
systematic information about what the balance is between ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ policy 
instruments more broadly in welfare state reforms. 
 This deficit is a serious one. If it is true, as Pierson originally argued, that cuts 
will typically come in the form of ‘invisible’ policy instruments, this can explain both why 
retrenchment has been possible and why this has not systematically led to an electoral 
backlash. This is because voters should be less able to associate politicians and parties with 
policy changes the voters dislike. In contrast, if ‘visible’ policy instruments are the name of 
the game when the welfare state is retrenched, this would be one more blow to the new 
politics argument.  
 To move the debate forward, we have collected data on all pension and 
unemployment reforms in Britain, Denmark, Finland, and Germany from 1974 to 2014 and 
coded which policy instruments were actually employed. This means that we cover countries 
with very different welfare models (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and Palme, 1998) across 
two policy fields that enjoy diverse levels of public support (van Oorschot, 2006). In total, we 
have coded 1,030 policy instruments using a coding scheme with 13 distinct categories that 
cover all major aspects of citizens’ social rights, including benefit qualification period, 
nominal benefit level, indexation rules and employability requirements. This gives us a 
unique opportunity to explore which policy instruments are used, for what purpose 
(expansion or cutbacks) and in which countries. 
 We find a relatively consistent picture. Nominal benefits levels, arguably the 
most ‘visible’ policy instrument there is, are much more frequently changed when social 
rights are being expanded than when they are being cut. This is particularly the case when it 
comes to highly popular old-age pensions, whereas cuts to nominal benefits are comparably 
more frequent in unemployment benefits. There is also a clear tendency for ‘invisible’ policy 
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instruments to be more frequently used in the context of cutbacks, and more so for pensions 
than for unemployment.  
We also find interesting cross-country variation. The starkest pattern of 
‘visibility’ being associated with expansions and ‘invisibility’ with cutbacks is found in 
Britain and Denmark. Two explanations are plausible for this result. First, in Germany and 
Finland welfare benefits are often insurance-based, which means that issues relating to, for 
instance, contribution levels and the assessment base for calculation of benefits are more 
important – as a result of how the programs are set up technically. Second, the political 
systems of Germany and Finland exhibit what Powell and Whitten (1993) call low clarity of 
responsibility especially due to the frequent use of coalition governments. However, if voters 
do not know whom to blame for a welfare cutback, the probability for a government to be 
punished or at the ballot box is much lower. Consequently, the pressure on governments to 
hide cuts by choosing invisible instruments decreases in countries where the institutional 
setup of the political system blurs responsibility attribution. This may be another reason why 
German and Finnish politicians might have opted for a broader selection of policy 
instruments: they simply had less to fear from the voters than their peers in Britain and 
Denmark. This, in sum, is also an example of how the choice of policy instrument is 
dependent on the national context. 
  
Instrument choice and the new politics of the welfare state 
A prerequisite for voters to punish politicians for retrenching welfare is that the voters are 
able to link events such as a declining living standard to concrete policy choices and, 
ultimately, individual politicians or parties. Without such a ‘causal chain of responsibility’, 
voters cannot react to changes they dislike (Arnold, 1990). According to Pierson (1994: 20), 
this means that ‘[t]hose engaged in efforts to initiate unpopular policies will try to lower 
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visibility of their reforms by complicating the reconstruction of causal chains that would 
allow voters to exact retribution’. 
 There are several ways to achieve such causal blurring, but the most 
straightforward is by selecting policy instruments that by design make it difficult for voters to 
evaluate the negative effect of a reform (Pierson, 1994; see also Weaver, 1986). A given 
welfare program normally consists of a number of elements, all of which can be changed as 
part of a reform. The most fundamental, of course, is the benefit paid out to recipients. A 
benefit recipient will, if she pays any attention, notice that the monthly benefit has been 
reduced. This is not just because the nominal benefit is what defines a welfare program, but 
also because it is easy to understand and has immediate consequences in terms of declining 
living standards.  
 There are, however, many other elements that in combination make up a 
welfare program. First, there are the rules governing access. These can include waiting 
periods (how long after a social risk occurs before a person is eligible?) and contribution 
levels and periods (how much and for how long must a person contribute to a program before 
she is eligible?). Second, there are rules governing benefit generosity. The most obvious is 
nominal benefit level, as discussed above, but there are also duration (for how long can a 
recipient receive benefits?), indexation rules (is the nominal benefit automatically regulated 
to correct for rising inflation or wages and with what factor?), and assessment base (in 
earnings-related programs, what part of the wage sum is used to calculate benefits, and how 
precisely is it done?). Third and finally, there are rules governing the behaviour of benefit 
recipients. The most important of these are rules regarding employability (e.g. is the recipient 
required to or offered the opportunity to voluntarily participate in activities meant to increase 
the likelihood of getting a job?).  
7 
 
 Many of these elements are much more technical, and therefore more difficult 
to comprehend, than changes in nominal benefit levels. Changing indexation has been 
highlighted as a prime example of so-called ‘invisible’ cutbacks (Pierson, 1994: 20-21, 173; 
Lindbom, 2007: 137-138; Green-Pedersen et al., 2012). If benefits are made to increase at a 
slightly lower rate than previously, this will escape the notice of most people, partly because 
nominal benefits will stay the same as before (and perhaps even increase, though at a slower 
rate) and partly because the effect will only manifest itself over the course of years. Benefits 
that are indexed at a lower rate than inflation will, over time, entail a substantial decrease in 
the purchasing power and, hence, living standards of recipients. Altering the wage base for 
calculating benefits may be even more opaque to voters. Other rules such as qualification and 
contribution periods are also likely to go unnoticed by most ordinary citizens.  
 The assumption of Pierson and other adherents of the new politics perspective is 
that modern-day welfare state politics is about avoiding blame for unpopular decisions. Yet 
while it is certainly true that the period since the 1970s has seen many cuts to citizens’ 
entitlements, it is not the case that expansion has been off the table either. Indeed, a little 
more than half of the policy instruments we coded for Britain, Denmark, Finland and 
Germany related to the expansion of citizens’ social rights. The majority of the expansions 
were in old-age pensions, but even for unemployment protection a sizable minority of all 
recorded changes were expansions (for more details, see below). 
 
[Figure 1 and 2 about here] 
 
Whether a policy instrument entails an expansion or reduction in generosity does not, of 
course, tell us anything about the magnitude or importance of the change. To gauge the 
relative importance of expansionary and retrenching events, we can consult the Generosity 
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Index for unemployment benefits and old-age pensions from the Comparative Welfare 
Entitlements dataset. The Generosity Index is a composite measure based on information on 
replacement rates (calculated as the percentage of the wage of the average production worker 
that an unemployed person or retiree is entitled to), rules governing access, and overall 
coverage of the citizenry (for details, see Scruggs, 2014). While not perfect, and certainly not 
exhaustive, the Generosity Index nevertheless provides an indication of the realized, or de 
facto, social rights that citizens in a country on average enjoy. 
Figure 1 graphs generosity for the retired in Britain, Denmark, Finland, and 
Germany from 1974 until 2010. With the exception of Germany, overall generosity has 
barely budged at all. Figure 2 turns to unemployment protection (where there is data until 
2011 for three countries). Here the marked drops, not least in the first part of the Thatcher 
years, emerge clearly in the British time series. Denmark saw declining generosity in the 
1990s and again as a reaction to the Great Recession, while German generosity dropped most 
substantially after the Hartz reforms in the 2000s. That said, generosity levels have hardly 
collapsed.  
The point we want to make is not that no cutbacks have occurred – they have in 
great numbers. Indeed, according to our data, since 1974 the four countries have experienced 
492 cutbacks in total, 316 of which were in unemployment protection programs. The point 
we want to make is rather that instances of expansion have not disappeared: they have 
occurred 534 times, to be exact. On balance, these expansionary events have kept generosity 
levels roughly the same for the old, while the smaller number of expansions compared to 
cutbacks in unemployment programs have meant a sliding generosity level for the jobless. 
 In the terminology of Weaver (1986) and Pierson (1994), the fact to appreciate 
is that there have been many more credit-claiming opportunities than is normally assumed in 
the literature. Politics is not all about avoiding blame for unpopular decisions. It is – still – 
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also about being rewarded for making policies that voters like. In the context of choosing 
politically appropriate policy instruments, this is not trivial. If ‘invisible’ policy instruments 
should be the preferred mode of implementing cuts, ‘visible’ policy instruments should be the 
preferred mode for expansions. This way, politicians should be best positioned to reap 
electoral rewards for pleasing voters.  
 Adding an extra layer of complexity, the institutional design of welfare 
programs is likely to have a big impact on the choice of policy instruments as well (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Pierson, 1993; 1994; Korpi and Palme, 2003).1 In tax financed universalist 
schemes based on citizenship rights like in Denmark, changes to nominal benefit levels, 
indexation rules or age brackets should be much more common, given that these parameters 
decide who gets how much benefits for how long.2  In contrast, governments in charge of an 
insurance-based system, such as the German system, have a much more diverse choice of 
policy instruments which can be used to adjust the welfare state. Given the importance of the 
insurance-mechanism, they will probably change the parameters of the formulae on the basis 
of which benefits are calculated, which involves policy instruments such as the contribution 
period, the assessment base as well as indexation rules. In contrast, a direct lowering of 
nominal benefit levels is less probable, given that they are perceived as individual ‘rights’ 
based on paid contributions. Finally, means-test is an important feature of the liberal welfare 
state, which is why this policy instrument should play an important role when existing 
                                                            
1 We do not discuss changes in private and occupational systems here. Although their development may be 
related to changes in public schemes (Wolf et al. 2014), the decisions are usually outside the direct 
responsibility of the governments which is why strategic use of instruments is not to be expected. 
2 It may be argued that nominal benefits are so low in Denmark that cutting them is unrealistic in an otherwise 
generous welfare state. Yet, although Danish first tier pension coverage is relatively low, it is worth noting that 
there is a means-tested component that doubles the nominal benefits for single and increases it with 50 % for 
couples. The means-tested benefit only caps off with an income of around 42,000 euros for singles and 49,000 
for couples. More importantly, and as we also show in Table 3, nominal benefits are rarely cut, but other 
elements of the pensions are instead. Almost a third of all cuts consist of increasing the age bracket, which does 
not affect the living standard of the retirees (i.e. creates additional poverty). In other words, there are ways for 
Danish politicians to cuts old age pensions without creating additional poverty – and this appears to be the way 
that cuts frequently have occurred. 
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programs are implemented.  Besides our clear cases – Denmark representing the Nordic 
welfare state, Germany the conservative insurance-based system, and UK the liberal welfare 
state – Finland qualifies as a hybrid between the welfare state of Denmark, where benefits are 
traditionally earned as a matter of citizenship rights, and that of Germany, where benefits are 
mostly earned via contribution payments (for details on the Finnish case, see Kangas, 2007; 
Kangas and Saari, 2007; for broader cross-country comparisons emphasizing the same point, 
see Scruggs and Allan, 2006; Castles and Obinger, 2008).  
 In sum, citizenship-based welfare programs will tend to see action on a smaller 
number of policy instruments than insurance-based welfare programs. None of the four 
countries we survey have purely citizenship- or insurance-based old-age pension or 
unemployment protection systems, as probably no country does. Still, Britain and Denmark 
certainly come closer to the citizenship-based end of the spectrum and Germany closer to the 
insurance-based end, with Finland in between. We therefore expect to see the most diverse 
choice of policy instruments in the latter two. 
The political system’s institutional design should also matter because it affects 
the so-called clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Pierson, 1994). If 
responsibility for political decisions is easy to place with the government, it is also easier for 
voters to blame the government for unpopular decisions (or credit it for popular ones). Clarity 
of responsibility can be blurred either by institutional features of the political system itself 
such as strong second chambers with veto powers or a Presidential system. Or it can be 
affected by the type of government with clear responsibility attribution in the case of single-
party majority governments and a more blurred attribution in the case of coalitions. In fact, 
Hobolt et al. (2013) show that the institutional setup matters much less than the cohesion of 
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the government  for performance voting – and, consequently, for the incentives of 
governments to use strategic timing in order to escape such performance voting.3  
Among our four countries, Britain exhibits the highest government clarity 
because of its tradition of single-party government, absence of cohabitation, and comparable 
ideological cohesion of the government. Both Finland and Germany have a tradition of 
multiparty governments, sometimes ideologically very diverse, that blurs responsibility 
significantly. Denmark has multiparty minority governments, but a party system where 
parties are grouped into two clearly demarked blocs. In sum – and in line with the 
government clarity-scores calculated by Hobolt et al. (2013) – we expect to see the strongest 
pattern of strategic use of policy instruments in Britain, followed by Denmark, Germany and 
Finland. 
Because the key contention of the new politics perspective is that politicians 
want to avoid being blamed for unpopular decisions and, if possible, receive credit for 
making popular ones, the overall popularity of different welfare programs should matter. 
Plenty of research documents that support for programs aimed at the able-bodied, above all 
else unemployment protection, is much less popular than programs aimed at the sick and the 
old (van Oorschot, 2006; Jensen and Petersen, 2016). This is mainly due to the character of 
risks the respective programs address (Jensen 2012). Whereas pensions cover the life-cycle 
risk of old age and everybody expects to benefit from a pension when he or she gets old, 
unemployment protection is directed at labour-market risks and, clearly, not all citizens have 
the same hazard to get unemployed. A natural expectation from this observation is that the 
most marked use of ‘invisible’ policy instruments will be in relation to cuts in welfare 
programs like old-age pensions, elderly care and health. Similarly, when it comes to 
                                                            
3 More exactly, Hobolt et al. (2013) defines institutional clarity by weak committees, unicameralism, absence of 
federalism, and a parliamentary system. Government clarity, on the other hand, is defined by dominance of one 
party, single-party government, absence of cohabitation, and ideological cohesion of the government. 
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expansionary reforms, the most marked use of ‘visible’ policy instruments should also be in 
relation to these popular welfare programs.  
 
The data 
Our dataset contains information on legislative changes in the social rights of citizens with 
regard to old-age pensions and unemployment protection in Britain, Denmark, Finland, and 
Germany from 1974 to 2014. The two programs were selected for three reasons. First, they 
constitute a core part of what is conventionally understood as ‘the welfare state’ and, as a 
result, are prominently featured in a very long list of publications on the politics of the 
welfare state. Second, old-age pensions are normally much more popular than unemployment 
protection among the public, as explained above. Third, both programs are transfer schemes, 
meaning that we can code them using the same coding scheme, which is important if we want 
to compare the two programs.  
 As already indicated, the four countries were chosen because they provide great 
variation in terms of their respective welfare state models (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi and 
Palme, 1998; Scruggs and Allan, 2006; Castles and Obinger, 2008) and political systems 
(Lijphart, 1999). Britain and Denmark share an emphasis on citizenship as the basis for 
eligibility, but apart from that are very different. Britain is a classic example of a residual 
welfare state, where benefits are mostly means-tested and relatively low. Denmark, in 
comparison, has substantially more generous benefits and less frequently employs a (strict) 
means test. Germany is the archetypal insurance-based system, where benefits are tied to 
earnings history and membership of occupational schemes. Finland is frequently lumped 
together with the other Nordic countries, but in fact exhibits several insurance-based features 
both when it comes to unemployment protection and old-age pensions (Kangas, 2007). The 
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four countries also represent different political systems and therefore have different degrees 
of clarity of responsibility.  
 The time period was chosen because 1974 marks the first full year after the first 
oil price crisis. It is conventional to view 1973 as the end year of the Golden Age of welfare 
state expansion as well as the signalling of the new era of permanent austerity (Pierson, 1994; 
1996). It is in this period where we should expect to find the clearest attempts at blame 
avoidance from re-election-motivated politicians and therefore also the period we believe is 
relevant to document empirically. 
For the dataset we coded all legislative changes relating to the 13 aspects of 
citizens’ social rights, listed in Table 1, with numbers 1-6 reflecting rules of access, numbers 
7-10 reflecting rules of generosity, and numbers 11-13 reflecting rules of recipient conduct. 
For each of the 13 dimensions we identified whether the reform event implied a cutback or an 
expansion in citizens’ social rights. For example, in 1995 the British government reduced the 
maximum duration of the unemployment insurance benefit from one year to six months. This 
is coded as a cutback in the duration period (no. 7 on the list above). The same year the 
British government increased the pension age of women from 60 to 65 years. This is coded as 
a cutback in the social rights relating to age brackets (no. 5 on the list). Employability is 
coded as an expansion if a recipient is offered the option to participate in an activity and as a 
cutback if participation is mandatory. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Deciding what policy instruments are ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ is not hard science, but must 
ultimately rest on an arbitrary assessment. Degree of visibility may, moreover, also vary by 
country because some elements are simply more important in some places. This is an issue 
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we return to below. The end points, at least, are relatively easy to pin down. Changes in 
nominal benefits level (no. 8) and age brackets (no. 5) are clearly ‘visible’, while indexation 
(no. 9) and assessment base (no. 10) are ‘invisible’. We would also argue that duration period 
(no. 7), employability (no. 11), and means testing (no. 6) are quite ‘visible’, though less so 
than nominal benefits level. Qualification (no. 1) and contribution periods (no. 2) are, 
conversely, technical and unlikely to attract the attention of most citizens, so we consider 
them relatively ‘invisible’. The remaining policy instruments are considered in-between.  
To gather information about reforms, we collected as many secondary sources 
as possible and supplemented these with searches in legislative databases when necessary. 
The coding was conducted by a team of trained research assistants and all coding decisions 
were subsequently controlled by a senior researcher. In the event the senior researcher did not 
agree with the original coding, the relevant research assistant and senior researcher discussed 
the coding decision in detail to reach agreement; however, there were very few such 
instances. 
 To illustrate the data structure, Figure 3 displays the coded expansionary and 
retrenching changes in British unemployment protection since 1974. The black circles with a 
full line connecting them represent expansions, whereas the hollow circles with a dashed line 
represent cutbacks. On the vertical axis the number of coded changes is listed. The major 
reforms in 1980, 1986, 1995, and 2011/12 are clearly visible. It is also obvious that there 
have been many more cutbacks than expansions in the area of unemployment protection. This 
is in line with extant research, which often highlights the British experience as outstanding 
for the retrenchment it has witnessed (e.g., Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Clasen, 2007; Clasen 
and Clegg, 2011; Jensen, 2014). It is also worth noting that while the Generosity Index in 
Figure 2 reported essential stability in the domain of British unemployment benefits after the 
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first wave of cutbacks in the 1980s, our data pick up the major reforms we know to have 
happened. We believe, in other words, that our data has a high degree of face validity. 
 
Policy instrument choice in four countries 
Table 2 presents the data for Britain. The policy instruments are organized with the most 
‘visible’ at the top and the most ‘invisible’ at the bottom. The first two columns report the 
data for old-age pensions and the last two columns the data for unemployment protection. 
The numbers are within-column percentages. In the first column, for instance, we see that 
54.8 per cent of all pension expansions are in nominal benefit level, while the remaining 45.2 
per cent is spread out over the other 12 policy instruments. In the second-to-last row, the 
number of observations is reported, and in the last row, the ratio between expansions and 
cutbacks is reported. This gives an impression of whether the policy area has seen more 
expansions than cuts. 
 Table 2 is revealing. Starting at the bottom, we first observe that pensions have 
seen more expansions than cutbacks, while the opposite is true for unemployment protection. 
With regard to how the expansions and cutbacks were implemented, we see the expected 
pattern. Nominal benefits where changed more than three times as often when pensions were 
expanded compared to when they were retrenched. Age brackets, another ‘visible’ policy 
instrument, were admittedly changed in relation to cutbacks (i.e. raising the retirement age), 
but even when considering nominal benefit level and age brackets together, ‘visible’ changes 
are still 1.6 times more likely in the event of an expansion than in the event of a cutback. 
Similarly, the four most ‘invisible’ policy instruments are 1.8 times more likely to be used 
when pensions are cut than when they are expanded.  
 Turning to unemployment protection, a very different picture emerges. It is, 
first of all, worth stressing that the absolute number of expansions is small, 14 in all. The 
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majority of them have been in the form of offering more or better training to the jobless. 
Compared to pensions, it is obvious that British politicians have not shied away from making 
use of ‘visible’ policy instruments when retrenching this set of social rights. Nominal benefit 
cuts make up 21.4 per cent of all cuts and employability requirements another 42.9 per cent. 
This fits well with the notion that British unemployment protection has seen one of the most 
substantial roll-backs in modern welfare state history by (mostly Conservative) governments 
happy to admit their responsibility.  
 
[Table 2-5 about here] 
 
Table 3 presents the Danish data. As in Britain, expansions happen more frequently than 
cutbacks in the pension area, while cutbacks are more frequent when it comes to 
unemployment protection. A whopping 78.3 per cent of all pension expansions occur as 
nominal benefit hikes. This is 4.2 times more often than cutbacks of nominal benefits. Taking 
age brackets into account, ‘visible’ policy instruments are still 1.9 times more likely to be 
used for expansions than cutbacks. The reverse is true for the ‘invisible’ policy instruments. 
The assessment base was changed in 22.2 per cent of all cutbacks and never for expansions. 
Indexation rules were made more generous a single time in the 40 years we study.  
Moving to unemployment protection, we see that nominal benefit increases are 
relatively more frequent than decreases (though there are more cutbacks in absolute 
numbers). This aligns well with the fact that unemployment protection enjoys a greater 
degree of public support and protection from elite actors such as unions in Denmark than in 
Britain (Jensen, 2014). At the same time, employability rules have been used in the context of 
cutbacks 1.9 times more often than in the context of expansions, which also fits well with 
what we know from the historical record (ibid.). ‘Invisible’ policy instruments have been 
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employed less frequently than in pensions, probably reflecting that cutbacks to 
unemployment benefits are easier to justify than to pensions, even in Denmark. 
Table 4 presents the data for Germany. Several things are noteworthy compared 
to the last two tables. First, there have been more cutbacks than expansions in pensions. This 
also reflects that Germany is the only one of our four countries that has experienced a decline 
in the Generosity Index (cf. Figure 1). Second, the number of reforms is larger than in both 
Britain and Denmark. This is a result of the more complex decision-making process in 
Germany, which leads to a large number of comparably small reforms. Third, there is a more 
even spread in the chosen policy instruments. This reflects the insurance-based German 
system where issues relating to contribution levels and periods, qualification periods, and the 
assessment base of benefits are more central than in the citizenship-based and tax-financed 
systems of Britain and Denmark.  
These distinctions aside, there are also multiple similarities between Germany 
and the two former countries. The nominal benefits of pensions are 1.9 times more likely to 
be increased than decreased. Taking age brackets into account, expansions are 1.3 times more 
likely to happen via a change in these ‘visible’ policy instruments than are cutbacks. 
Indexation rules and the assessment base are 1.4 times more likely to be changed when 
benefits are decreased than when they are increased. Reforms of unemployment protection, 
meanwhile, exhibit a more balanced use of policy instruments. There are only two areas 
where we observe marked differences between expansions and cutbacks: employability is 
more frequently cut and means testing more frequently expanded.  
Finally, Table 5 presents the Finnish data. The most noteworthy point here is 
that unemployment protection has seen more expansions than cutbacks. This is the result of 
reforms in the 1980s (in particular a large one in 1984) that dramatically improved 
generosity, something that can also be seen in Figure 2. Before this period, Finland was a 
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clear laggard compared to the other Nordic countries. Apart from that difference, Finland 
resembles the other three countries. Expansions of pensions take the form of changes to 
nominal benefits 2.4 times more often than decreases, while indexation rules and the 
assessment base are changed 1.7 times more frequently when cutbacks are on the table. 
Perhaps because real expansion of unemployment protection has been an option in Finland in 
the period we study, nominal benefits were 2.1 times more likely to be increased than 
decreased. As in Germany, means tests were also associated with expansions, while 
employability, as everywhere, is related to cutbacks. 
 
Formal tests of associations 
Having provided descriptive evidence for the relationship between expansions, retrenchment 
and the choice of policy instruments, we now briefly report two formal tests of associations to 
buttress our point that policy-makers are strategic in the choice of policy instruments. To do 
this, we recoded policy instrument choice in the four countries into an ordinal scale (1 = 
‘clearly invisible’, 2 = ‘quite invisible’, 3 = ‘in-between’, 4 = ‘quite visible’, and 5 = ‘clearly 
visible’) in line with our argument above. We first calculated Cramer’s V – a measure of 
association for nominal and ordinal scaled variables – to inspect whether there is a systematic 
association between expanding/retrenching and instrument choice across the two schemes in 
the four countries. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 displays the values of Cramer’s V for the strength of the association between policy 
direction (expansion vs. retrenchment) and instrument choice (five-point scale). Using 
Cohen’s (1988: 222-225) standards for Cramer’s V with four degrees of freedom, the 
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association between  policy direction and instrument choice for pensions range between 
medium-strong (for Finland, Germany and Britain) to very strong (for Denmark). For 
unemployment benefits Cramer’s V range between small-to-medium (for Britain and 
Germany) to medium-strong (Denmark and Finland). This match our descriptive findings 
above, where we observed stronger patterns for pensions than for unemployment, and 
provides a statistical evidence of our relatively simple comparison of frequencies in Tables 2-
5 above.4 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
To further inspect the strength of the association and to control for bias and outliers, we 
merged all four country datasets and ran ordinal logit models with policy direction as 
independent variable and policy instrument choice as dependent variable, again using the 
five-point-scale. Since the purpose is to test the robustness of our conclusions, we ran the 
analysis with so-called jackknife estimated standard errors to control for bias and potential 
outliers in our policy data. Table 7 reports a total of four models (M1-M4). M1 provides the 
baseline result, showing that the direction of a reform is strongly correlated with the degree of 
visibility. In M2 we include a dummy for each country to control for country-specific factors. 
We use Denmark as reference category because Table 3 above suggests that Denmark has 
seen the most extensive use of visible instruments given its overall reform activity. It turns 
out that this impression is borne out of the more formal test as well with Germany coming out 
as the country with relatively fewest visible instruments. M3 and M4 look at the two domains 
                                                            
4 The values for Cramer’s V are robust to changes in our visibility coding: When two out of our 13 instruments 
are randomly put in neighboring visibility categories instead of the original ones, values for Cramer’s V do not 
change substantially and even increase in some cases. 
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of pensions and unemployment protection, respectively. 5 It is evident that the correlation 
between reform direction and degree of visibility is much stronger for the former than for the 
latter, confirming our expectation that policy-makers act more strategic on the more popular 
pension scheme.6  
 All in all, Table 7 allow us to conclude that (1) the direction of reforms matters 
for use of visibility (arguably due to politicians’ desire to avoid blame for unpopular 
decisions); (2) much more so for pensions than for unemployment protection (arguably due to 
differences in deservingness) and (3) ‘invisible’ reforms are used more often in Denmark 
than in Germany (presumably due to differences in government clarity). Interestingly enough, 
Britain and Finland comes in between the two extremes of Denmark and Germany, so it is 
obvious that all cross-country differences cannot be boiled-down to a question of how easy it 
is to ascribed blame to the government (at least not the way we have conceptualized it here).  
 
Conclusion 
There is little doubt that the data reported here broadly supports the new politics perspective. 
‘Visible’ policy instruments, above all else nominal benefits, were much more likely to be 
used for expansionary purposes than for retrenchment – and especially so for the highly 
popular old-age pensions. ‘Invisible’ policy instruments such as indexation rules and rules 
governing the assessment base of benefits were more likely to be employed for cutbacks than 
for expansions, and again most markedly in the domain of pensions. Choice of policy 
instruments, of course, also reflects the institutional design of the welfare state, so it is not 
surprising that there were cross-country differences as well. In the insurance-based systems 
                                                            
5 One reform falls into both domains, which means that we lose one observation when analyzing the data 
separately for pensions and unemployment. 
6 We have also tested if the marginal effect of direction on degree of visibility is significant in all four countries, 
which it is.  
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of Germany and Finland, a broader selection of policy instruments is used than in the 
citizenship-based systems of Britain and Denmark. 
 One of the most damaging critiques of the new politics perspective has been 
that governments appear to be able to get away with retrenchment without an electoral 
backlash (Giger, 2010; 2011; Giger and Nelson, 2011; Schumacher et al., 2013). One reason 
for this is probably that Pierson’s original thinking about voters is too blunt. Voters care not 
only about a big welfare state, but also about a sound economy, and there are variation both 
between voters and over time how salient each of these concerns are (Arndt, 2013; Giger and 
Nelson, 2013). Still, our findings point to an additional explanation that relates directly back 
to Pierson’s original argument: governments escape punishment because they expertly select 
the policy instruments that maximize credit for expansions and minimize blame for cutbacks. 
In fact, our findings clearly emphasize the strategic room for manoeuvre that governments 
enjoy when they reform the welfare state. By strategically using invisible instruments for 
cutbacks and visible instruments for expansions, welfare state change may indeed be possible 
without major electoral slack. Hence, governments do not get away with retrenchment 
without backlash because voters do not care, but because governments employ reform 
strategies. 
Future research will need to test this straightforward expectation that the effect 
of welfare cutbacks on governments’ vote share is conditional upon the policy instruments 
chosen to implement the reform. In doing so, it will be important to remember that it may not 
necessarily be the case that policy instruments are equally ‘visible’ or ‘invisible’ in different 
countries. To be sure, nominal benefits are universally easier to understand than indexation 
rules and assessment base. Yet the latter, more technical policy instruments may nonetheless 
play a large role for voters in insurance-based systems for the simple reason that they are so 
22 
 
important for the generosity of benefits in these systems. Whether or not that is the case will 
be a topic for future research.  
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Figure 1. Generosity Index for old-age pensions 1974-2010 
 
Source: Scruggs et al. (2014). 
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Figure 2. Generosity Index for unemployment benefits 1974-2010/11  
 
Source: Scruggs et al. (2014). 
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Table 1. Policy instruments coded 
Dimension No. Policy instrument Description 
Rules of access 1 Qualification period How long does it take for a person to 
become eligible? 
 2 Contribution period How long must a person contribute to a 
scheme before becoming eligible? 
 3 Contribution level How much must a person contribute? 
 
 4 Waiting period How long after a social risk occurs 
before a person is eligible? 
 5 Age brackets How old must a person be to be 
eligible? 
 
 6 Means test Is there a means test? 
 
Rules of benefits 7 Duration period How long can a recipient receive 
benefits? 
 
 8 Nominal value What is the nominal value of the 
benefits? 
 9 Indexation rule Is the nominal benefit automatically 
regulated and with what factor? 
 10 Assessment base Has the base for calculating benefits 
changed? 
Rules of conduct 11 Employability Is the recipient required to or offered 
the opportunity to voluntarily 
participate in activities meant to 
increase the likelihood of getting a job? 
 12 Health documentation Is the recipient required to document 
that she is unable to work? 
 13 Residence Does it matter where and under what 
circumstances the recipient lives? 
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Figure 3. Reform events in unemployment protection in Britain 1974-2014 
 
Note: The black circles with the full line connecting them represent expansionist reform events. The hollow 
circles with the dashed line represent reductions. The number of reform events is reported on the vertical axis. 
The thin vertical dashed lines (e.g., in 1979, 1983, and 1987) represent election years.  
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Table 2. Instrument choice in Britain 1974-2014  
 
 
Pensions Unemployment 
 
 
Expansions Cutbacks Expansions Cutbacks 
M
os
t i
nv
isi
bl
e 
---
---
---
---
 M
os
t v
isi
bl
e 
 Nominal benefit level 54.8 17.2 7.1 21.4 
Age brackets 0.0 17.2 7.1 3.6 
Duration period 2.4 0.0 0.0 3.6 
Employability 0.0 0.0 57.1 42.9 
Means test 2.4 3.5 0.0 1.8 
Waiting period 0.0 3.5 0.0 3.6 
Contribution level 16.7 20.7 7.1 3.6 
Residence 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 
Health documentation 0.0 3.5 0.0 1.8 
Contribution period 4.7 6.9 0.0 0.0 
Qualification period 0.0 3.5 14.3 5.4 
Indexation rules 9.5 13.8 7.1 8.9 
Assessment base 9.5 10.3 0.0 0.0 
 Number of observations 42 29 14 56 
 Expansions/cutbacks 1.5 0.25 
Note: The numbers reported are within-column percentages except the bottom two rows, which report 
the number of observations and the ratio between expansions and cutbacks, respectively. The 
instruments are ranked with most ‘visible’ at the top and most ‘invisible’ at the bottom. 
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Table 3. Instrument choice in Denmark 1974-2014 
 
 
Pensions Unemployment 
 
 
Expansions Cutbacks Expansions Cutbacks 
M
os
t i
nv
isi
bl
e 
---
---
---
---
 M
os
t v
isi
bl
e 
 Nominal benefit level 78.3 18.5 50.0 27.4 
Age brackets 4.4 25.6 7.1 7.1 
Duration period 1.5 3.7 4.8 8.3 
Employability 1.5 0.0 16.7 32.1 
Means test 0.0 7.4 0.0 3.6 
Waiting period 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.4 
Contribution level 5.8 14.8 4.8 7.1 
Residence 4.4 3.7 4.8 1.2 
Health documentation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Contribution period 2.9 3.7 4.8 9.5 
Qualification period 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Indexation rules 1.5 0.0 2.4 1.2 
Assessment base 0.0 22.2 2.4 0.0 
 Number of observations 69 27 42 84 
 Expansions/cutbacks 2.6 0.5 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 4. Instrument choice in Germany 1974-2014  
 
 
Pensions Unemployment 
 
 
Expansions Cutbacks Expansions Cutbacks 
M
os
t i
nv
isi
bl
e 
---
---
---
---
 M
os
t v
isi
bl
e 
 Nominal benefit level 23.9 12.9 28.4 23.0 
Age brackets 13.4 15.7 2.9 0.9 
Duration period 1.5 4.3 13.7 15.0 
Employability 0.0 0.0 2.9 20.3 
Means test 6.0 5.7 14.7 5.3 
Waiting period 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.9 
Contribution level 19.4 25.7 10.8 7.1 
Residence 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Health documentation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Contribution period 1.5 4.3 2.9 2.7 
Qualification period 10.5 0.0 6.9 6.2 
Indexation rules 4.5 12.9 5.9 9.7 
Assessment base 19.4 20.0 8.8 8.9 
 Number of observations 67 70 102 113 
 Expansions/cutbacks 0.96 0.90 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 5. Instrument choice in Finland 1974-2014 
 
 
Pensions Unemployment 
 
 
Expansions Cutbacks Expansions Cutbacks 
M
os
t i
nv
isi
bl
e 
---
---
---
---
 M
os
t v
isi
bl
e 
 Nominal benefit level 34.4 14.3 35.3 16.9 
Age brackets 14.1 22.5 0.0 7.7 
Duration period 0.0 0.0 8.1 9.2 
Employability 3.1 4.1 14.7 43.1 
Means test 21.9 8.2 25.0 4.6 
Waiting period 0.0 0.0 2.2 7.7 
Contribution level 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Residence 1.6 0.0 0.7 3.1 
Health documentation 0.0 6.1 0.0 0.0 
Contribution period 1.6 0.0 5.9 1.5 
Qualification period 3.1 2.0 6.6 3.1 
Indexation rules 6.3 14.3 0.7 3.1 
Assessment base 12.5 18.4 0.7 0.0 
 Number of observations 64 49 136 65 
 Expansions/cutbacks 1.3 2.1 
Note: See Table 1. 
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Table 6: Cramer’s V for association between policy direction and instrument choice across 
policydomains in four countries, 1974-2014 
 Denmark Finland Germany UK 
Pensions 0.429 0.277 0.218 0.223 
Unemployment 0.277 0.248 0.138 0.182 
Number of obs. 222 314 352 141 
Degrees of freedom for Cramer’s V=4. 
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Table 7: Ordinal logit model of effect of reform direction on visibility of policy changes 
 M1 
All 
M2 
All 
M3 
Pensions 
M4 
Unemployment 
Reform direction (dummy) 0.515*** 0.524*** 0.687*** 0.294!  
(0.114) (0.119) (0.194) (0.162) 
Germany  -1.184*** -1.457*** -0.896*** 
  (0.166) (0.276) (0.229) 
Finland  -0.698*** -1.061*** -0.347 
  (0.161) (0.290) (0.214) 
Britain  -0.811*** -1.063*** -0.622* 
  (0.202) (0.320) (0.261) 
Cut point 1 -1.599*** -2.379*** -1.951*** -2.821*** 
 (0.104) (0.154) (0.278) (0.209) 
Cut point 2 -1.071*** -1.837*** -1.648*** -1.960*** 
 (0.0897) (0.147) (0.274) (0.190) 
Cut point 3 -0.457*** -1.204*** -0.875** -1.416*** 
 (0.0823) (0.144) (0.271) (0.187) 
Cut point 4 0.771*** 0.0707 -0.455 0.465** 
 (0.0844) (0.138) (0.267) (0.177) 
N 1,030 1,030 416 613 
-2 loglikelihood -1480 -1453 -539.6 -824.2 
Degrees of freedom 1 4 4 4 
LR χ2 20.64*** 75.50*** 50.50*** 23.47*** 
BIC’ -13.70 -47.75 -26.38 2.20 
Note: Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ! p<0.10; the dependent 
variable is visibility of policy changes (ordinal scale: 1 ‘clearly invisible’, 2 ‘quite invisible’, 3 ‘in-between’, 4 
‘quite visible’, 5 ‘clearly visible’). 
 
 
